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I. Introduction
The emergence of financial conglomerates which engage in a
broad array of activities has challenged nations' abilities to ensure
the competitiveness and the safety of their financial systems. Regula-
tors have become increasingly concerned that a banking or securities
crisis in one country could threaten the safety of the global financial
system.
The responses of regulators generally are governed by the struc-
ture of their respective financial systems. Some nations prohibit a
single entity from engaging in both banking and securities activities,
while others permit a single entity to provide all forms of financial
services. Other countries have a mixed system, allowing a broad ar-
ray of financial services to be conducted through different entities.
The International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) l has attempted to establish a common framework for the
international regulation of securities firms and towards this end, has
expressed a willingness to cooperate with the Basle Committee on
Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices (the Basle Commit-
tee).2 At IOSCO's annual meeting held in Washington in September
of 1991, securities regulators tentatively endorsed certain basic prin-
I See IOSCO, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT (1990); IOSCO, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT (1991),
Memorandum From iOSCO s Technical Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, app. A, IOSCO
(Sept. 1991)(XVI Annual Conference of IOSCO) [hereinafter, IOSCO Memorandum].
In September, 1991, IOSCO held its 16th Annual Conference. By October 1991,
IOSCO had ninety-one members, including sixty security firm regulators; the remaining
members include exchanges and other self-regulatory organizations.
The Technical Committee, which was established in 1987, currently has four
subcommittees:
Working Party 1: Multinational Disclosure and Accounting,
Working Party 2: Regulation of Secondary Markets,
Working Party 3: Regulation of Market Intermediaries, and
Working Party 4: Enforcement and the Exchange of Information.
See id. at 7.
The focus of this Article is on Working Party 3.
2 The Basle Committee, which meets at the Bank for International Settlements in
Switzerland, is comprised of the representatives of the central banks and supervisory au-
thorities of the Group of 10 members (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States) and Luxem-
bourg. In 1988, it produced a final version of proposed capital adequacy standards for
internationally active banks. Basle Committee members have promised to fully implement
these standards by January 1, 1993. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETrLEMENTS COMMITrEE
ON BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, Report on International Convergence of
Capital Measurements and Capital Standards (Revised Baste Agreement), AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw (July 1988) [hereinafter Basle Accord].
A 1990 survey indicated that eight members had begun to implement them: Canada,
France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States;
other EC members will meet them when they implement EC directives. See INTERNATIONAL
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ciples on capital adequacy in a Memorandum from IOSCO's Techni-
cal Committee to the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision.
IOSCO stated that it was "willing, in principle, to conclude as a first
step, an agreement with the Basle Committee of Banking Supervi-
sors which would establish an international standard for market risk
requirements and a definition of permitted regulatory capital."
In January of 1992, the Basle Committee and the Technical
Committee of IOSCO met jointly for the first time. At that meeting,
both committees reached preliminary understandings related to the
development of (1) international capital requirements for banks that
take into account interest rate risk on tradeable securities and price
risk on equity positions held by banks; and (2) minimum capital
levels for international security firms and methods to reduce market
distortions arising from the different regulatory treatment of interest
rate risks and credit risks. 4 Regulators also reached a consensus that
a building block approach, an approach that separates specific issuer
risks and general market risks, should be applied to assess capital
requirements against debt securities held by banks or security firms
and for all equities held by banks. Some securities regulators would
apply the same approach to equities. A majority of bank supervisors,
however, seemed willing to follow the approach of securities regula-
tors for assessing capital requirements against the securities trading
conducted by banks. 5
At the end of June 1992, the Finance Ministers of the European
Community agreed in principle on the proposed directive on capital
adequacy which requires banks to treat trading activities in the same
fashion as securities firms and directs securities firms to treat non-
trading activities in a manner similar to banks for purposes of capital
requirements. The new draft of the Directive still must be approved
by the European Parliament. 6
This article posits that regulators should ensure that financial
conglomerates are regulated in a manner that helps maintain the
safety and soundness of the global financial system. Specifically, this
MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS 36
(1991) [hereinafter IMF, CAPITAL MARKETS].
3 JOSCO Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2.
4 Richard C. Breeden and E. Gerald Corrigan, Joint Statement at the Meeting Be-
tween IOSCO and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Jan. 1992)[hereinafter
Joint Statement]. Progress may be slow, however. Following a July meeting of the Techni-
cal Committee of IOSCO, Richard Breeden indicated that he would send a letter to Gerald
Corrigan outlining points of contention within IOSCO and between IOSCO and the Basle
Committee. See Disagreement Plagues Committee Discussions on Harmonized International Capital
Standard, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., July 28, 1992, at 1.
5 Joint Statement, supra note 4, at 2.
6 See Credit Institutions: Capital Adequacy Negotiations Wrapped Up and Breakthrough on
Investment Services, EUROPEAN INSIGHT (July 3, 1992) [hereinafter Credit Institutions];
Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and
Credit Institutions, 1992 O.J. (C 50) 5 [hereinafter Amended CAD].
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article argues that functional regulations should be designed to sepa-
rate banking and securities activities and to mandate the assessment
of capital requirements by activity regardless of whether this entity is
a bank or security firm. Part II of this article explores the risks faced
by securities firms and bankers and the regulatory responses pro-
posed in various international fora. Part III focuses on the efforts of
IOSCO to develop a consensus on similar types of rules for securi-
ties regulators. Part IV compares the emerging consensus among
securities regulators with that of banking regulators. Part V exam-
ines the European Community's (EC) latest proposal for a Capital
Adequacy Directive (CAD). Part VI concludes that efforts to coordi-
nate regulation among securities firms and between securities firms
and banks will continue and may eventually lead to a common ap-
proach for regulating financial conglomerates. 7
II. Basic Questions
A. What Are the Diferences Between Banks and Securities Firms?
1. Theory.: Banks and Securities Firms Are Two Diferent
Entities
In principle, banks and securities firms serve two distinctly dif-
ferent functions. Banks are viewed as quasi-public institutions that
act as: (1) depositories which serve as custodians of the public's sav-
ings; (2) intermediaries which channel funds from savers, in the form
of deposits, toward consumer and business borrowers, in the form of
loans; and (3) payment intermediaries which provide liquidity to con-
sumers and businesses." In contrast, securities firms are risk-taking
institutions which serve an intermediary function, in part, by bring-
ing together investors and borrowers who issue securities. Reflective
of these roles, the goal of bank regulators traditionally is to ensure
the safety and soundness of the banking system,9 whereas the goal of
securities regulators is to protect investors.10
Traditionally, bank assets (loans) are mostly long-term and un-
marketable. I The major risk faced by banks is credit risk, that is, the
7 This article was prepared before the October 1992 annual meeting of IOSCO. It is
possible that some changes may occur at that conference.
8 Vincent Di Lorenzo, Public Confidence and the Banking System: the Policy Basis for Con-
tinued Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 647, 648 (1986)
[hereinafter Public Confidence]; see also I MICIE, BANKS, AND BANKING § 2 (A.D. KOWALSKY et
al. eds.) (1986 & Supp. 1992).
9 Di Lorenzo, Public Confidence, supra note 8, at 648.
10 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Arrangements
for the Regulation and Supervision of Securities Markets in OECD Countries, 41 FIN. MKT. TRENDS
17, 20 (1988) [hereinafter OECD, Regulatory Arrangements]; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 11 (1989), microformed on
GAO/NSIAD-89-115 [hereinafter GAO, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 89-115].
11 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SYSTEMIC
RISKS IN SECURITIES MARKETS 45 (1991) [hereinafter OECD, SYSTEMIC RISKS].
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risk that a borrower cannot repay debts. 12 Banks also face market
risk, in the form of liquidity risk, the risk that they can not meet a
financial obligation to a customer, creditor, or investor, and price
risk, the risk to earnings arising from changes in interest and foreign
exchange rates and from market volatility.' 3
Banks maintain a capital base to protect against these risks. The
major component of their capital requirements is determined by first
assigning weights to different types of assets and then assessing capi-
tal as a percentage of risk-weighted asset requirements. 14 Further,
banks generally have two safety nets if they experience difficulty: (1)
short-term emergency assistance from the central bank; and (2) a de-
posit insurance scheme that protects depositors. The quid pro quo for
official central bank support is tight, prudential supervision and capi-
tal adequacy requirements.' 5
Bank supervisors assume that banks hold most assets to maturity
and, therefore, credit risk is the predominant risk. 16 Thus, bank as-
sets (loans) are not valued at market prices (marked-to-market).' 7
Supervisors seek to prevent "fire sales" of assets that would lead to
bank difficulties requiring central bank assistance or the use of de-
posit insurance. The present regulatory tools include: (1) a require-
ment.of portfolio diversification; (2) credit limits related to capital;
(3) capital requirements; (4) reserve requirements; (5) deposit insur-
ance; (6) record-keeping and reporting rules; and (7) examinations
by supervisors. 18 Despite the focus on credit risk, supervisors also
take into account, at least to some extent, market risk.' 9 When bank
regulators associated with the Basle Committee harmonized regula-
12 See Basle Accord, supra note 2.
13 See CmcoRP, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (1991). Banks manage their market risks
through the creation of committees that examine liquidity, interest rate sensitivity, and
other critical variables. Securities firms also manage market risks closely. Salomon Broth-
ers has a daily Departmental management reviews to examine marked-to-market valua-
tions. SALOMON, INC., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (1991).
14 See Bask Accord, supra note 2.
15 See IMF, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 44.
16 See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, CAPITAL ADEQUACY
STANDARDS FOR SECURITIES FIRMS 25-26 (1989) [hereinafter, IOSCO, INITIAL REPORT].
17 Id. at 26. Nonetheless, banks, at least in some countries, may report unrealized
gains and losses. See, e.g., CITICORP, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT at 56; CHEMICAL BANKING
CORP., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, 48, 50 (1991).
18 See IMF, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 44.
19 See Base Accord, supra note 2, 42, 43. The Basle Accord requires at least some
capital to back off-balance sheet items (which include guarantees, interest rate swaps, and
foreign exchange commitments). A bank translates its off-balance risks into "credit risk
equivalents" that then counts as part of risk-weighted assets. An alternative approach can
be used for interest rate and foreign exchange commitments, under which a bank marks
these commitments or obligations to market, that is, values them at market prices, and
adds an extra amount of capital to cover bank exposure over the period of exposure. The
effect is to capture at least part of the general market risk related to changes in interest
rates. Id. 1 42, 43, annexes 2-3.
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tions regarding bank capital, the focus was on credit risk.20 The Ba-
sle Committee plans to address risks stemming from interest rates,
foreign exchange movements, and other market risks. 2 '
Securities firms trade for their own account, underwrite new is-
sues, serve as secondary market makers and act as agents when they
implement customer orders.2 2 They also act as intermediaries be-
tween borrowers and investors. Further, they serve as brokers by
acquiring securities for their customers' accounts and as dealers by
holding or trading securities for their own accounts. Securities
firms' assets are highly marketable in the very short term, but are
exposed to the risk that market prices fluctuate.2 3 Securities firms
accept the market risk that prices for securities will vary dramatically
because of the specific risk relating to the issuer of the securities by
taking a position that is large in relation to the total market for that
security (concentration).2 4 They also accept general market risks re-
lated to changes in interest rates, exchange rates, and other
variables.2 5
Securities firms' primary credit risk is increased costs if their
counter-parties (clients or traders) delay or default because of
changes in prices in the underlying securities, delays in domestic or
international settlement or other reasons.2 6 Unlike banks, securities
firms generally do not have direct access to official safety nets. They
do, however, benefit when central banks aim to inject liquidity in
times of market crisis.2 7 In contrast to bank regulators, who aim to
minimize risks, securities regulators aim to create a fair and transpar-
ent framework for risk taking.28 Securities regulators also take a
more comprehensive approach to regulation and focus on both
credit/counter-party risk, also referred to as settlement risk, and
market risk, also referred to as position risk. Reflecting the highly
marketable nature of securities and the trading activity of securities
firms, regulators require that securities be valued at daily market
20 Id. 8.
21 Id.; but cf Richard C. Breeden, Remarks of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman of U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission to the Institute of International Bankers 10 (May 27,
1992)("Though Basle standards seem to have worked reasonably for credit risk, the deci-
sion to postpone developing the methodology for quantifying interest rate risk and impos-
ing capital requirements against it seems unfortunate.")
22 See IOSCO, INITIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 8.
23 Id. at 11.
24 Id. at 12.
25 See id.
26 See id. at 12-13.
27 Thus, unlike a system of bank deposit insurance, individual securities firms or in-
termediaries can fail and their customers will lose money. In countries with a universal
banking system or with a hybrid system that allows banks to have securities subsidiaries,
securities firms, intermediaries and customers will benefit directly from central bank injec-
tion of liquidity. See OECD, SYSTEMIC RISKS, supra note 11, at 44.
28 See OECD, Regulatory Arrangements, supra note 10, at 24.
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prices, "marked-to-market", to take into account both market risk
and credit risk.
Net capital of securities firms is roughly defined as the firm's net
worth minus non-liquid assets plus subordinated debt.29 If customer
accounts are segregated, this definition is basically a capital require-
ment on the positions taken by the firm on its own behalf. Merely
valuing the security at its market price is not enough, however, be-
cause this valuation reflects past price changes rather than the price
at which the firm may be required to liquidate its holdings in the
future and does not take into account counter-party risks.30 There-
fore, securities firms count something less than the full market value
of securities held as part of net capital. That deduction is referred to
as a "haircut". The haircut may be 100% where none of the security
would count as part of net capital, if the security is non-liquid and
hence, particularly risky. 3' The haircut on securities that are
marked-to-market effectively achieves in one calculation what, for
banks, is a two-step process of determining risks and setting capital
requirements against risk-weighted assets.
Securities firms also have initial entry or base capital require-
ments and minimum capital requirements designed to protect cus-
tomers in the event of a counter-party default. Customers do not
need protection from a firm that does not deal with them.3 2 Thus, a
firm acting on its own behalf will need less capital than one that acts
on behalf of third parties without receiving securities or client
funds.33 In turn, firms that receive client securities or funds, but seg-
regate them and promise delivery on request, will need less capital
than one that does not segregate client funds.34 Among the main
methods of securities regulators are: (1) the establishment and en-
forcement of standards for disclosure about the nature of the securi-
ties; and (2) the monitoring of securities professionals to prevent
29 Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1992). See Definition of Capital,
compiled in Capital Requirements for Multinational Securities Firms, TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (Nov. 13, 1990)(XV An-
nual Conference of IOSCO in Santiago, Chile, Tome 1) [hereinafter IOSCO, Remarks].
30 See Comparison of Equity Position Risk Requirements and Scope for Harmonization, compiled
in Capital Requirements for Multinational Securities Firms, TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (Nov. 13, 1990) (XV Annual Confer-
ence of IOSCO in Santiago, Chile, Tome 1) [hereinafter IOSCO, Equity Position Risk]. The
specific risks for a security is captured in the daily mark to market requirement because, for
example, a gradual deterioration in credit standing should be reflected in the market price
of exchange traded securities. Id.
31 Id. 13-14.
32 See The Base Requirement and Minimum Requirement for Capital, compiled in Capital Re-
quirements for Multinational Securities Firms, TECHNICAL COMMITrEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (Nov. 13, 1990) (XV Annual Conference of
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manipulation and fraud.35
2. Practice: Banks and Securities Firms can be Part of One
Entity
In practice, the line between securities firms and banks is consid-
erably less distinct than the preceding analysis would suggest. The
terms "securities firms" and "banks" encompass a wide variety of
entities. At one extreme, the United States36 and Japan3 7 severely
restrict banks' ability to engage in securities businesses, although
these restrictions are weakening as bank regulators redefine what
banks can do. In contrast, in countries such as Austria, Germany,
and Switzerland, banking and securities activities are combined into
a single entity, called a "universal bank."38 In Germany and Austria,
anyone seeking to engage in securities trading must obtain a banking
license.3 9 Some countries have a mixed or hybrid system that per-
mits banks to engage in banking and allows both banks and non-
banks to carry out securities activities.40
Some countries allow securities activities to be conducted in a
subsidiary of a bank or a holding company. 4 1 A financial conglomer-
5 OECD, Regulatory Arrangements, supra note 10, at 20.
36 Universal banking, defined as banks that are permitted to engage in both banking
and security transactions, is prohibited in the United States and in Japan, but the edges of
this prohibition have become increasingly frayed. For example, U.S. banks can: (1) have
affiliates dealing in municipal obligations, mortgage-backs, and commercial paper; and (2)
own a discount brokerage if it does not take positions in securities. The Federal Reserve
has loosened its definition, under section 20 of Glass-Steagall, of "not principally en-
gag[ing]" in securities activities. Thus, bank-holding companies will not now violate sec-
tion 20 of Glass-Steagall if revenues from security transactions are less than ten percent
(first introduced in 1987 with 57 ceiling). See IMF, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 41;
see also Glass-Steagall Act § 20, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1989).
37 Japanese banks can enter securities business abroad, but not at home. A 1989
paper on universal banking in Japan examined five approaches: subsidiary approach,
either separate or multi-functional, holding company, universal bank and piecemeal, for
developing a universal banking system. Japan's Financial System Research Council, affili-
ated with the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, issued second report in 1990,
focusing on two approaches to integration: subsidiary or a multi-functional unit that could,
at the wholesale level, engage in a variety of financial activities. At the same time, Funda-
mental Research Council, affiliated with the Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance,
urged separate subsidiaries and firewalls. See IMF, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 41.
38 OECD, SYSTEMIC RISKS, supra note 11, 37. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxem-
bourg, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden also have universal banking systems. OECD, Regula-
tory Arrangements, supra note 10, at 24. But, these countries also permit nonbank entities to
engage in securities transactions and could also be called hybrid systems. OECD, Sys-
TEMIC RISKS, supra note 11, $ 132.
39 CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRADING
AROUND THE CLOCK: GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 72, n. 11
(1990) [hereinafter, OTA, TRADING AROUND THE CLOCK].
40 These include: Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. OECD, SYSTEMIC RISKS,
supra note 1l, $ 37.
41 Banks can own securities subsidiaries in the United Kingdom. U.S. bank holding
companies can, subject to strict limitations, engage in securities activities. See IMF, CAPITAL
MARKETS, supra note 2, at 41.
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ate may also be in the insurance business. 42 The type of position
that a securities firm may take differs among countries. France, for
example, is moving away from a system where the securities firm acts
solely as a broker and does not take a position in equities. Securities
firms in Japan and the United States act as dealers when they take
positions and as brokers when they match orders. Securities firms
also may act solely as dealers by taking a position on their own books
in every trade that they execute. 43
Securities regulators may be grouped into four main patterns.44
Universal banks are regulated mainly by one banking supervisor.4 5
In a hybrid system, a banking supervisor may regulate the banking
and securities activities of a bank, while a securities regulator super-
vises brokers. Alternatively, a single entity in a mixed system may be
subject to regulation by two agencies that agree on how to regulate
the entity.46 In a strictly separated system, bank regulators will regu-
late banks, while securities regulators will regulate securities firms.47
Other regulatory features also differ widely. 48 One distinction is
what the regulators are empowered to regulate. In the United States,
for example, there are different regulators for banks, securities mar-
kets, and futures markets, and there are significant differences in
what activities are regulated. For example, U.S. subsidiaries of regu-
lated securities firms are not, themselves, regulated. Thus, U.S. se-
curities firms have an incentive to shift activities, such as interest rate
swaps, bridge loans, and foreign exchange, to subsidiaries in order
to reduce the costs of meeting capital and other regulatory require-
ments.4 9 Therefore, without agreements on how to regulate securi-
ties activities internationally, a foreign securities subsidiary from a
country that maintains separate banking and securities firm regula-
tors may go unregulated in a country that has only banking regula-
tors and assumes that the home country is doing the regulation. The
42 See MERRILL LYNCH & CO., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1991); MERRILL LYNCH & CO.,
1990 10K, 6 (Merrill Lynch has an insurance subsidiary, a U.S. edge act corporation that
trades foreign exchange, and a London-based bank subsidiary that trades foreign ex-
change, lends, and accepts deposits).
43 See IOSCO, Equity Position Risk, supra note 30, at 6.
44 The following discussion is based on OECD, Regulatory Arrangements, supra note 10,
at 25-26.
45 Note, however, some aspects of securities regulation might be left to self regula-
tory organizations or local regulators. See id. (discussing the German system; the stock
exchanges, for example, are not subject to supervision from bank regulators).
46 In the United Kingdom, a "lead regulator" is designated. In Spain, there are for-
mal arrangements to share regulatory responsibility. See id. at 26.
47 In the United States, a bank may have a securities subsidiary; the bank will be regu-
lated by bank supervisors and the securities subsidiary will be regulated by the securities
and to some extent the banking, regulators. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, ACTIVITIES OF SECURITIES SUBSIDIARIES OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, GAO/GGD
90-48 (1990)[hereinafter, GAO, SECURITIES SUBSIDIARIES].
48 The discussion that follows is based on OECD, SYSTEMIC RISKS, supra note 11.
49 OECD, SYSTEMIC RISKS, supra note 11, 142.
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remedy for this patchwork coverage is for regulators to agree on who
will cover what.
Another distinction in regulatory features utilized in different
countries is whether the supervisory function for securities firms is
primarily federal, as in the United States, or whether it is provincial,
as in Australia, Canada, and Germany. 50 An additional difference is
the extent to which the supervision is based on statutes, regulations
promulgated by an administrative body, and regulations of a self-
regulatory body.5' These distinctions add complexity to interna-
tional efforts to harmonize regulations.
B. Why Harmonize Regulations?
1. The Key Reason: Systemic Risk
The main reason to harmonize financial regulation is to avoid a
potential global financial meltdown by minimizing systemic risks.
Systemic risks are those financial risks with the potential for effects
reaching beyond the local economy in which they occur.52 Serious
financial risks can stem from a crisis arising initially in firms, domes-
tic financial markets, international financial markets or the global
economy. For example, concerns about systemic risk arose in the
Herstatt bank failure in 1974, in the emergence of the LDC debt cri-
sis in 1982, and in the equity market plunges in 1987 and 1989.
While a number of developments, including the advance in technol-
ogy, the deregulation of foreign exchange and financial markets, the
innovation in financial services and the rapid growth in international
financial markets, have fostered the development of more efficient
capital markets, regulators fear that these developments may also in-
crease systemic risks. 53
A related concern is the potential for regulatory arbitrage. If the
regulations of securities in one country is more relaxed than in a
second country, it will be cheaper to attract business and to issue
securities in the first country. The second country may then seek to
reduce its securities regulation, which may be followed by reductions
in regulation by the first country. This "race to the bottom" could
50 A Federal Finance Ministry proposal urges the merger of German stock exchanges.
See EC Financial Market Regulations Analyzed at London Conference, 58 BNA Banking Rep. No.
22, at 970 (une 1, 1992).
51 See International Organization of Securities Commissions, Working Party 1, Inter-
national Equity Offers, in PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE XIV ANNUAL CONFERENCE IN VENICE IT-
ALY (September 1989)[hereinafter, IOSCO, International Equity Offers].
52 See OECD, SYSTEMIC RISKS, supra note 11, 14 (citing Sean O'Connor, SYSTEMIC
RISKS IN SECURITIES MARKETS); GAO, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 89-115, supra
note 10, at 26 (defining systemic risk as "the possibility that failure of a firm will spill over
national boundaries, causing firms in other countries to fail.")
53 See OECD, SYSTEMIC RISKS, supra note 1l, 8. For example, concerns about sys-
tematic risks arose in the Herstatt bank failure in 1974, the emergence of the LDC debt
crisis in 1982, and the equity market plunges in 1987 and 1989. Id. at 11.
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reduce securities regulation to a point where investors do not receive
effective protection. An alternative view of regulatory arbitrage is
that investors seek to place their funds in the safest place, in which
case there might be a "flight to quality" or a "struggle to the top."5 4
A similar process of regulatory arbitrage could occur between
banks and securities firms. In the 1980s, countries liberalized their
financial systems5 5 and made it possible for banks and securities
firms to engage in new activities. If regulations permitted, one out-
come of regulatory arbitrage might be that a bank would seek to
restructure itself into a securities firm.
Competitiveness is another key concern as global markets be-
come more integrated. 56 If securities regulation in one country
makes issuing securities more expensive than in a second country, a
company will choose to issue securities in the second country. 57 If
bank regulation is more onerous than securities regulation, a com-
pany will choose to issue securities rather than to borrow from a
bank. 58 At present, it may be that bank regulations make it more
expensive to borrow from banks than to issue securities in some
countries, while the opposite is true in other countries. To the extent
that costs are equal for securities firms -internationally or are equal
for banks and securities firms, all institutions would be competing on
a level playing field.
2. Possible Models for Harmonization
There are a number of different models of regulatory harmoni-
zation among securities firms and between securities firms and
banks. Within a country, the highest degree of harmonization might
be accomplished by designating one regulatory agency for both
54 See GAO, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 89-115, supra note 10, at 25; Caro-
line Bradley, 1992: The Case of Financial Services, 12 Nw.J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 124, 156 (1991).
55 See OECD, SYsTEMIC RISKS, supra note 11, 7-9 (citing the abolition of exchange
controls, the reduction of barriers to entry to national markets, the unfixing of commission
rates, and other factors); IMF, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 44.
56 See IMF, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that international equity
trading rose from $73 billion in 1974 to $1,528 billion in 1989, while the value of total
world trading on secondary markets rose from $7,025 billion in 1986 to $11,717 billion in
1989).
57 Or, at least, it may be cheaper to issue securities in many countries to raise the
most amount of funds and to develop a broad, international market. An IOSCO paper
notes that the popularity of multijurisdictional equity offers has increased, from $6 billion
in 1985 to $48 billion in 1987 (although it fell to $19 billion in 1988). Recent efforts have
aimed at reducing the regulatory costs of disclosure so as to permit such offers. See
IOSCO, International Equity Offers, supra note 51, at 15.
58 In the United States, a number of large companies relied less on bank loans and
more on issuing their own commercial paper in the 1980s. See Jan Shuijer, Banks Under
Stress: Analysis of Recent Developments in Banking, OECD OBSERVER, Dec. 1991, at 19. It
should be noted, however, that commercial paper issuers do not have the same disclosure
burden as issuers of securities. See Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77c
(1981)(noting exempt securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c (1981)(noting instruments that are not securities).
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banks and securities firms which applies a common or at least a simi-
lar set of rules to each institution. Another looser approach is to have
separate functional regulations and several regulators examine a fi-
nancial institution, but to designate a "lead" regulator that coordi-
nates the regulators' examinations of banking and securities
activities.
Short of having the same regulator nationally or the same regu-
lator internationally, harmonization can mean different things. Four
models of financial harmonization are: (1) commonality; (2) compa-
rability; (3) national treatment; and (4) mutual recognition. 59 Com-
monality involves setting universal minimum standards and is the
approach adopted by the Basle Committee for banks and adopted by
IOSCO for securities firms. 60 Comparability is based on the recogni-
tion and development of substantially equivalent, but not identical,
rules. 6' This approach was adopted by the United States and Can-
ada in their approval of a single disclosure statement for multi-
jurisdictional offers of securities of U.S. or Canadian entities, and in
a Memoranda Of Understanding (MOU) which is designed to seek
information and assistance to enforce domestic securities regula-
tions. 62 National treatment is the principle that a country subjects
both domestic and foreign institutions to its own rules.63 The
United States generally follows this approach. Mutual recognition is
the principle that allows a foreign firm to operate, within a country's
borders, under the rules of the foreign firm's country of origin.64
This is generally the approach taken by the European Community. 65
The mechanics of achieving harmonization among securities
firms alone seem to present an almost insurmountable problem, at
least initially. Securities firms operate under a variety of different
regimes with substantial differences among them on what activities
they may engage in (primarily securities activities or universal bank-
ing), who regulates them (ranging from one financial services regula-
tor to different regulators for various activities and from a primarily
national regulator to primarily state regulation), and whether they
9 OTA, TRADING AROUND THE CLOCK, supra note 39, at 5.
60 Id. at 5, 76.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 7.
63 Id. at 5.
64 Id.
65 The GAO characterizes the European Community approach as a mixture of setting
minimum standards, mutual recognition, and home country control. See GAO, INTERNA-
TIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 89-115, supra note 10, at 40. In the banking arena, European
Community member countries that currently do not have universal banking are consid-
ered likely to adopt it so that their domestic banks are not disadvantaged, within their
borders, relative to other EC banks. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY: U.S. FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPETITIVENESS UNDER THE SINGLE MARKET PROGRAM,
GAO/NSIAD-90-99 (1990). For a description of the impact of competitiveness and regula-
tory arbitrage, see Bradley, supra note 54, at 124.
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confront legal regimes with statute-based rules, administrative rules,
or rules promulgated by a stock exchange.
An approach to harmonization that separates the regulation by
the type of activity, whether banking or securities, might be achieved
by having two separate regulators promulgate rules for a single en-
tity or by having one regulator apply two sets of regulation to one
entity. Overlapping systems of regulation and regulators could
prove costly and politically awkward. This difficulty might be mini-
mized by utilizing a system of coordination of regulators. Harmoni-
zation could proceed by developing one set of common minimum
standards for securities firms and a separate set of common mini-
mum standards for banks. Development of common international
rules by a functional entity alone, however, does not solve the prob-
lem of regulatory arbitrage nor does it establish a level playing field
because banks are also securities firms in some countries and both
banks and securities firms can engage in similar activities. If com-
mon rules for different entities are developed, negotiations could
then proceed to develop harmonized rules for both types of entities.
This might be the most realistic way to proceed, given the experi-
ence of IOSCO and the Basle Committee.
3. Current Efforts to Harmonize Regulations
Several multilateral organizations presently focus on exchanging
information in the securities arena. 66 These include IOSCO, the In-
ternational Councils of Securities Dealers, and Self-Regulatory As-
sociations, a group founded in 1988, consisting of SROs and
Security Dealer Associations from Canada, Japan, the United King-
dom and the United States, and the Federation International des
Bourses, a group consisting of thirty-three stock exchanges. The In-
ternational Councils of Securities Dealers and Self-Regulatory Asso-
ciation expressly aim to promote harmonization of securities
regulations.
IOSCO aims at coordinating securities regulation among coun-
tries. It has also exchanged proposals with the Basle Committee, a
group of bank regulators, that move towards developing a partial
convergence of bank and securities regulation. Several multilateral
fora serve as a way to exchange information and as a source for po-
tential proposals on the harmonization of financial regulations. 67
For example, although the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), an official agency with representatives
from twenty-four industrial countries, is mainly concerned with en-
couraging global growth and the expansion of trade, it examines
trends in financial flows and regulation. Similarly, the Group of 30,
66 OTA, TRADING AROUND THE CLOCK, supra note 39, at 77.
67 Id.
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to which individuals from major international banks, multinational
corporations, and government officials belong, examines issues in in-
ternational economic and financial policy making. Additionally, the
contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) are considering ways to facilitate trade in financial
services .68
The most extensive efforts at harmonization are underway in the
EC. The EC's efforts to create a single market have spawned a
number of proposals to harmonize monetary financial regulations.
Several EC Directives specifically aim at harmonizing bank regula-
tion in order to permit institutions licensed in one country to operate
throughout the EC by the beginning of 1993.69 Thus, a bank author-
ized to operate in one EC country will effectively have a "passport"
to operate everywhere in the EC without obtaining authorization
from each national authority. The EC is also considering two Direc-
tives, the Capital Adequacy Directive and the Investment Services Di-
rective, that would harmonize investment firm capital standards and
permit investment firms, like banks, to operate throughout the entire
EC.
The CAD, as it was initially proposed in 1990, also seeks to:
0 ensure the protection of individual investors and the safety and
soundness of the financial system in the integrated European
market,
a set a level playing field between banking and non-banking invest-
ment firms,
* boost the attractiveness of the EC as a financial center, and
* permit access to financial markets so as not to stifle competition. 70
Despite the professed objective of establishing a level playing field,
68 GATT is a set of multipartite treaty rules. Originally, the rules were designed to
be implemented as part of the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was sup-
posed to be established as a special agency of the United Nations, like the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Development and Reconstruction. The
ITO, however, was never established. Nonetheless, seven rounds of negotiations on trade
rules have taken place and these have dramatically lowered tariff barriers to merchandise
trade. In the current, Uruguay Round, some countries, led by the United States, have
sought to add rules governing trade in services. See RALPH H. FOLSOM ET. AL. 1991 Docu-
MENT SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED
COURSEBOOK 18 (2d ed., 1991).
69 See IMF, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 36-37. In 1989, the EC adopted three
key directives designed to create a single banking market. The Second Banking Directive,
adopted by the EC Council in December 1989, harmonizes laws and rules for credit insti-
tutions and permits institutions licensed in one EC member country to operate throughout
the entire EC. The Own Funds Directive, adopted by the Council in April 1989, establishes
a standard EC definition of capital. The Solvency Directive, adopted in December 1989,
sets forth EC rules on counter-party risk weights, treatment of collateral and guarantees,
and other issues related to solvency. The thrust of these directives is broadly in line with
the capital adequacy framework of the Basle Committee. A major difference between the
EC and Basle Accord is that the EC directives mandate that tier-2 capital cannot include
unrealized capital gains. Id.
70 Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Capital Adequacy of Invest-
ment Firms and Credit Institutions, Economic and Social Committee, 1991 O.J. (C 69) 1.
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the draft of the CAD proposed in 1990 does not resolve the issue of
harmonizing bank and securities firm regulation. Rather, the pro-
posed Directive suggests that regulators examining universal banks
should either apply the banking directives to the entire bank and the
CAD to securities firms or separate the securities activities and apply
securities standards to the securities portfolio and banking standards
to the rest of the bank. 7' The EC revised its proposal markedly at
the end ofJanuary, 1992 by mandating that the CAD would apply to
only the proprietary trading accounts of banks and investment
firms. 7 2 For securities firms, the rest of their activities would be sub-
ject to bank-like capital requirements, thus potentially requiring
sharp increases in security firm capital requirements. In contrast,
banks that could securitize assets, such as mortgages, could face a
lower capital requirement.
III. IOSCO Consensus on Capital Requirements for Securities Firms
The Memorandum from IOSCO's Technical Committee to the Basle Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision, issued by IOSCO in September, 1991,73
appears to reflect a consensus among securities regulators concern-
ing a number of the key rules geared to establish a minimum level of
capital adequacy. Nonetheless, securities regulators expressed reser-
vations among themselves on how to ensure capital adequacy.
A. Capital Requirements of Securities Firms
1. United States
The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) net capital
rule specifies a minimum capital requirement, a base capital require-
ment and limits the amount of non-customer funds that count to-
wards the net capital requirement. In addition, it specifies a
maximum ratio of aggregate indebtedness to capital. 74 Under Secur-
ities Exchange Act Rule 15c3- 1, net capital is generally defined as net
worth less haircuts on securities positions minus non-liquid assets,
like buildings, plus certain subordinated debt.75 Subordinated loans
are included in net capital because they are subordinated to the
claims of all creditors. They must be approved for inclusion as regu-
latory capital by a self-regulatory organization, the initial term must
71 Proposal for a Council Directive on Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and
Credit Institutions 1990 OJ. (C 152) 6.
72 Amended CAD, supra note 6.
73 See IOSCO Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1-3.
74 The basic rule is that aggregate indebtedness cannot exceed 1500% of net capital.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a) (1992). Aggregate indebtedness is defined as total money
liabilities of a broker or dealer. Id. § 240.15c3-1(c)(1). A broker or dealer can escape from
this limitation through compliance with the "alternative method." See infra text accompa-
nying notes 84-86.
75 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1992).
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be more than one year, and the loan cannot be repaid if repayment
would reduce regulatory net capital below required amounts. In ad-
dition, loans from a person may not exceed, for more than ninety
days, 70% of the securities firm's total of net worth and subordinated
loans. 76
The rule describes brokers and dealers engaging in different
types of activities and mandates an absolute minimum net capital re-
quirement. Under the basic method for calculating net capital, bro-
kers and dealers engaging in a general securities business shall
maintain net capital of not less than $25,000. 7 7 Other categories of
brokers and dealers include clearing firms, introducing firms, new
firms, firms in the business of writing options, market makers and
specialists. Brokers and dealers cannot allow their aggregate indebt-
edness to exceed 1500% of their net capital. 78 This limit is effec-
tively a base capital requirement equivalent to 6.67% of aggregate
indebtedness. 79
The SEC takes a comprehensive approach towards counting a
firm's proprietary trading activities as part of net capital. Securities
are valued at market price (i.e. marked-to-market). The securities are
further discounted through a system of capital charges, called "hair-
cuts," that are based on market risk, price volatility and liquidity of
individual securities. The haircuts are designed to protect against
potential adverse movements in securities' prices related both to
general market and to specific firm risks.80
Haircuts for equity securities under the basic method set forth
under the rule are 30% for readily marketable equities, 100% for
those that are illiquid, which is defined as those that have no ready
market and variable for debt instruments, depending upon time to
maturity and upon the issuer and the amount that an option is cov-
ered or is out of the money.8 l Additional haircuts may be applied for
undue concentration.8 2 Some positions can be offset, because the
76 Id. § 240.15c3-1(d).
77 See id. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1). In September 1989, the SEC proposed a number of
changes designed to strengthen the net capital rule. The main provisions would raise the
absolute minimum requirement and reduce haircuts. Exchange Act Release No. 27,249,
54 Fed. Reg. 40,395 (1989). For example, broker dealers that carry customer accounts
would have to maintain a minimum capital level of $250,000. Id. For those that would be
required to hold a minimum capital level of at least $100,000, haircuts would be set at
fifteen percent. Id.
78 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a).
79 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES MARKETS: CHALLENGES
TO HARMONIZING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS REMAIN, GAO/GGD-92-41 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter, GAO, SECURITIES MARKETS 92-41].
80 See IOSCO, Equity Position Risk, supra note 30, 4. The specific risks for a security
is captured in the daily mark to market requirement because, for example, a gradual dete-
rioration in credit standing should be reflected in the market price of exchange traded
securities. Id.
81 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi) (various provisions).
82 Id. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(m).
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securities firm's aggregate risk has been reduced. For example, a
dealer with a short position of $100 and a long position of $100 in
the same security will have a haircut that is less than a long position
of $200.83
A broker-dealer can escape from the aggregate indebtedness
limit and have lower haircuts by using the alternative method for cal-
culating net capital. Under Rule 15c3-1 (0, the general precept holds
that a broker or dealer must maintain net capital equivalent to the
greater of $100,000 or 2% of aggregate debit items computed under
the "Formula for Determination of Reserve Requirements" in Ex-
hibit A to Rule 15c3-3. 84 Furthermore, haircuts are generally lower;
haircuts on equity securities fall to fifteen percent. Like the basic
method, the alternative method permits some positions to be off-
set.85 Most large securities firms in the United States use this
method. 86
2. International Comparisons
A number of securities regulators follow a comprehensive ap-
proach and rely upon a cushion provided by capital adequacy re-
quirements. In France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, capital includes net worth, which is defined as share capital
and retained earnings. In those countries, the net worth calculation
in based upon securities positions that are marked-to-market and in-
cludes unrealized gains or losses.87
Subordinated loans are counted as part of capital in France,88
83 A dealer takes a short position when he has sold securities that he does not own for
future delivery, possibly because he expects to purchase the securities more cheaply in the
future. A dealer takes a long position when he agrees to buy securities in the future. Under
the Rules:
[T]he deduction shall be 30 percent of the market value of the greater of the
long or short position and to the extent the market value of the lesser of the
long or short position exceeds 25 percent of the market value of the greater
of the long or short position, there shall be a percentage deduction on such
excess equal to 15 percent of the market value of such excess ....
Id. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(J). An SEC proposal to reduce the 30% charge to 15% has been
under consideration since 1989. Exchange Act Release No. 27,249, 54 Fed. Reg. 40,395
(1989).
84 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(f).
85 The Rule provides:
[T]he deduction shall be 15 percent of the market value of the long posi-
tions. To the extent the market value of the short position exceeds 25 per-
cent of the market value of long positions, there shall be a deduction equal to
30 percent of the market value of such excess....
Id. § 240.15c3-1(0)(3)(ii). An SEC proposal to reduce the 30% charge to 15% has been
under consideration since 1989. Exchange Act Release No. 27,249, 54 Fed. Reg. 40,395
(1989).
86 See IOSCO, Equity Position Risk, supra note 30, 6. See also SOLOMON INC., 1991
FORM 10Q 8 (Oct. 31, 1991)(noting switch to alternative method after May 31, 1991);
MERRILL LYNCH, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1991).
87 See IOSCO, Equity Position Risk, supra note 30, at 3.
88 In France, the market authority must approve the use of subordinated loans as
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the United Kingdom, 89 the United States, and in a number of other
countries.90 Like the United States, these countries limit the amount
of subordinated debt that may be counted as part of capital. In Ja-
pan, only foreign firms are allowed to include subordinated loans as
part of branch capital. Under certain circumstances, France9 l and
the United Kingdom 9 2 permit the use of guarantees as part of regu-
latory capital. Japan and the United States do not count any guaran-
tees. The ability to draw on subordinated debt helps securities firms
adjust rapidly to changes in capital requirements on their rapidly
changing portfolios that are marked-to-market.9 3 It also gives parent
holding companies flexibility in responding to the capital needs of
the regulated securities firm subsidiaries.
Base or minimum capital requirements are generally designed
to cover risks not directly linked to market or counter-party risks94
and to provide a cushion to meet firm obligations in the face of busi-
ness risks. They can be set by a variety of criteria, including floor
amounts,9 5 securities firms' expenditure volume,96 the amount of as-
regulatory capital and, in aggregate, subordinated loans may not exceed three hundred
percent of net worth. Id. at 6.
89 Although all subordinated loans to U.K. security firms must have an initial term of
at least two years, regulators distinguish between "long-term loans" that can be repaid on
three month's written notice and "short-term loans" that can be repaid on two day's no-
tice. Unlike the United States, U.K. regulators permit the uncommitted undrawn line of
credit to be included in capital subject to certain restrictions. In the United Kingdom,
subordinated loans may not exceed four hundred percent of net worth less intangible as-
sets. Id.
90 These include Australia (no limit), Singapore (regulators can approve up to one
hundred percent of paid capital), Hong Kong (guidelines suggest up to two hundred and
fifty percent of shareholder funds), and Switzerland (up to twenty-five percent of required
capital). But note, no subordinated loans can be counted as part of capital in Germany. See
GAO, SECURITIES MARKETS 92-41, supra note 79, at 61.
91 France counts bank guarantees for members of the stock exchange and MATIF;
this practice developed because of high base capital requirements. The regulatory author-
ity must approve the use of guarantees and total guarantees may not exceed three times
net worth. IOSCO, Remarks, supra note 29, at 7.
92 Guarantees may not exceed thirty percent of a firm's base capital and, if drawn
upon, funds may not be repaid if repayment would cause the firm to breach capital re-
quirements. Id.
93 See id. at 4. Presumably, France and the United Kingdom would offer a similar
rationale for the use of guarantees.
94 IOSCO, Base Capital Requirements, supra note 32, at 1. According to a survey in that
paper (valid as of October 1990), minimum requirements were DM 3 million for German
universal banks, Lira 50 billion for merchant bank subsidiaries of Italian commercial
banks, FF 25 million for French brokerage firms, $25,000 for U.S. security firms using the
indebtedness method and $100,000 for U.S. security firms using the alternative method,
$75,000 for Canadian security firms for members of self-regulatory organizations and
$25,000 for others. Id.
95 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1) (U.S. indebtedness method mandating mini-
mum of $25,000).
96 See TOSCO, Base Capital Requirements, supra note 32, at 2; GAO, SECURITIES MARKETS
92-41, supra note 79, at 54-56.
The base requirement in Japan is 25%o of securities firms' operating expenses exclud-
ing certain items that are easily adjustable (commissions and bond interest). GAO, SECURI-
TIES MARKETS 92-41, supra note 79, at 29. In the United Kingdom, the base requirement is
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sets handled, 97 the number of professional negotiators, 98 or business
requirements. 99  Minimum capital requirements are primarily
designed to ensure that securities firms' obligations to clients are
fully met and to serve as a cushion or a threshold level, below which
securities regulators may intervene to forestall a financial crisis. Gen-
erally, risk-based capital requirements will lead to a level higher than
mandated minimum levels, which constitute a floor to capital.
Like the United States, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom
use a haircut method to assess risk-based capital requirements on
debt and equity securities on the securities firms' own positions. For
equity securities, the United Kingdom has three methods for calcu-
lating haircuts: (1) a simple approach that gives no allowance for
hedging or diversification (Equity Method 1); (2) an approach that
gives allowances for hedging and diversification of holdings in a
given market (Equity Method 2); and (3) an approach that gives al-
lowances for diversification of portfolios that hold United States,
United Kingdom, and Japanese securities (Equity Method 3).i°° The
United States has two methods: (1) the basic or indebtedness
method; and (2) the alternative method. France and Japan apply
only one system of haircuts to equity securities.' 0 '
Securities regulators take into account the liquidity of the mar-
kets in setting haircuts on equities. In the United States, securities
without a ready market receive a haircut of 100% while those with a
ready market receive a haircut of 30% under the basic method or
15% under the alternative method. France, 10 2 the United Kingdom,
andJapan 03 have graduated requirements; haircuts are 10% to 25%
on marketable securities and 100% on unmarketable securities. The
United States,10 4 France, '05 Japan, and the United Kingdom' 0 6 also
require additional haircuts when a securities firm holds a significant
the highest of an established minimum for that type of firm or 25% of adjusted annual
expenses (one twelfth for clearing firms). Id.
97 See IOSCO, Base Capital Requirements, supra note 32, at 2 (referring to France).
98 See id. at 3 (referring to Ontario's requirement that includes a sum for each special-
ist, market maker, or trader).
99 See id. (referring to U.S. alternative method, which, under 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-
1 (f), requires security firms to have the greater of $100,000 or 2 percent of customer re-
lated receivables).
100 IOSCO, Equity Position Risk, supra note 30, 7.
101 Id. 8.
102 Haircut is 12.5% for "most liquid" securities and 20% for "other marketable"
securities. See id. 14 (noting proposed changes that took effect after the date of the
paper).
103 Haircuts depend on which section of an exchange a security is traded. First section
securities receive a 10% haircut, second section issues receive a 15% haircut, and marketa-
ble securities traded over the counter receive a 25% haircut. See IOSCO, Equity Position
Risk, supra note 30, 14.
104 If firm holdings of one issuer's security exceeds 10% of its net capital, the firm has
an additional 15% haircut on the excess. Id. 26. Also, if a firm has enough securities of a
publicly traded company to exercise actual or legal control, it may be barred from selling
the security. Id.
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proportion of an issue. The rationale is that the firm might have dif-
ficulty liquidating such positions rapidly.
For equity securities, securities regulators take different ap-
proaches toward haircuts when both long and short positions are
held and when trading strategies involving arbitrage, hedging, and
derivatives are pursued. Some regulators allow reduced haircuts if a
position is taken in a basket of stocks and an offsetting position is
taken in an index future. 10 7 Others will allow reduced haircuts only
for short and long positions in the same types of securities.' 08 Gen-
erally, securities regulators approach hedging firm portfolios, hedg-
ing specific positions, and arbitraging between baskets of stock and
index futures in very different ways. 10 9
For debt securities, haircuts in the United States, Japan, and the
United Kingdom are determined according to the type of issuers and
maturity."10 In these countries, the longer the maturity and thus the
higher the volatility, the greater the risk weight. For domestic gov-
ernment bonds, haircuts are virtually the same in Japan, in the
United Kingdom and in the United States."' Yet, haircuts vary con-
siderably on corporate bonds." 12
Each country has different offset rules for debt securities that
105 In France, a security firm's net exposure to a particular issuer should not exceed
40% of the net shareholders' funds of the firm. Id. 25.
106 Under U.K. andJapanese rules, a firm's exposure to one issuer is "concentrated" if
it exceeds 25% of the firm's adjusted net liquid assets. Additional haircuts are required on
concentrated exposures. Id. 24.
107 See id. 18 (referring to French and Japanese requirements).
108 In the United States, for example, there would be no requirement on short posi-
tions totalling up to 25% of long positions. But, there would be a haircut on the excess of
the short position over this percentage. See IOSCO, Equity Position Risk, supra note 30, 19
(referring, for the United States, to the net capital rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-
I (c)(2)(vi)(J)). The United States believes that there is a specific risk associated with short
positions (for example, short squeezes). The United Kingdom also reduces haircuts for
balanced books. See id. 21.
109 See generally, Capital Treatment of Certain Arbitrage Positions, compiled in Papers Relating to
Capital Adequacy of Securities Firms, Division of Market Regulation, U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (1991) (submitted to the Technical Committee of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions for the July 16-17, 1991 meeting in Paris, France
(1991) (including proposals for capital requirements on arbitraging and hedging strate-
gies, including: ADRs against common stock, convertible securities against common stock,
warrants on the shares of individual companies against common stock, index warrants
against a basket of common stock, stock index options and futures on a basket of common
stock, and forward contracts against an individual common stock).
I 10 See Comparison of Position Risk Requirements for Debt Securities, compiled in Capital Require-
merits for Multinational Securities Firms, TECHNICAL COMMrrrEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS OF SECURmES COMMISSIONS, at 1-3, (1990) (XV Annual Conference of IOSCO
in Santiago, Chile, Tome 1) [hereinafter IOSCO, Debt Position Risk].
III For a government bond with a maturity of less than three months, the haircut
would be 0% in the United States, .2% in Japan, and .25% in the United Kingdom. For a
government bond with a maturity of twenty-five to thirty years, the haircut would be 3.5%
in the United Kingdom, 5% in Japan, and 6% in the United States. Id. at 8, Annex A.
112 Each country defines what debt security "qualifies" as a high grade corporate se-
curity or, as in the United States, whether the security is deemed non-liquid because there
are not enough market makers. For good quality corporate bonds maturing in more than
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would permit lower haircuts on simultaneous holdings of long and
short positions of a government or high quality bond." t3 The rules
also vary with respect to the extent to which offsets on different is-
sues of government bonds with a similar maturity will be allowed and
with respect to whether offsets on different issues of government
bonds with different maturities will be allowed. For derivatives on
debt instruments, each country has different rules on the treatment
of financial futures, options, or interest rate products." 14
B. Toward an IOSCO Consensus on Security Firm Capital
In 1989, IOSCO's Technical Committee issued a concept paper
outlining a plan to establish a common framework for regulating se-
curities firms. IOSCO recommended that securities regulators:
e Establish risk-based capital requirements that include a base capi-
tal requirement linked to the size and nature of the firms activities, a
position risk requirement on firm holdings of securities, and a settle-
ment risk requirement to reflect the risk of nonperformance of a
contract to buy or sell;
* Limit the amount of financing, relative to owner's equity, that can
be considered as capital;
* Develop standard minimum capital requirements based on the
firm's type of business and dealings with customers; and
* Routinely examine securities firms to ensure compliance with fi-
nancial responsibility, capital adequacy, and record keeping
requirements. 1"
5
At the 1990 annual meeting of IOSCO, the Chairman of the
Technical Committee" 16 summarized a study that focused mainly on
comparing capital requirements for nonbank firms in France, Japan,
the United Kingdom and the United States. That study also focused
on the definition of capital, base and minimum capital requirements,
debt position risks and equity position risks. The Chairman of the
SEC, elected as the new chairman of the Technical Committee in
twenty-five years, the haircuts are 6.5% in the United Kingdom, 8% in Japan, and 9% in
the United States. Id. at Annex B.
113 See id.
114 See id. For example, "[in one country, only exchange traded derivative instruments
are allowed as an offset against the underlying cash instrument. In the case of options,
three of the countries consider whether the option is likely to be exercised. In those coun-
tries in which investment firms do interest rate swaps, the rules treat swaps for the pur-
poses of market risk as notional government bonds." Id.
In the case of options on debt or equities, some regulators consider whether the op-
tion will be exercised. Regulators sharply disagree on how to access capital charges
against options. Some regulators strongly support the use of financial models as a basis
for assessing risks and capital charges, while the United States argues for its system of
haircuts based on specific strategies. For an explanation of the U.S. position see Michael
P. Jamroz, The Net Capital Rule, 47 Bus. LAw 863, 882 (1992).
115 See IOSCO, INITIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 5.
116 See Remarks by Jeffrey Knight, compiled in Capital Requirements for Multinational Securities
Firms, TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COM-
MISSIONS, (1990) (XV Annual Conference of IOSCO in Santiago, Chile, Tome I) [herein-
after IOSCO, Capital Requirements].
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1990, stressed the importance of devising ways to harmonize bank
and security firm capital adequacy requirements to prevent the emer-
gence of "unfair competitive advantages." ' "17
At the September 1991 annual meeting, IOSCO issued the Mem-
orandum from IOSCO's Technical Committee on Banking Supervision."l8
The Memorandum describes the areas of agreement among securi-
ties regulators and sets forth principles by which they would agree to
harmonize securities regulations with bank regulations. The Memo-
randum focused mainly on position risk and defining some elements
of capital, rather than on base capital or minimum capital levels.
1., Definition of Capital for Securities Firms
Securities regulators firmly believe that securities firms that take
large proprietary trading positions or that act as dealers should be
able to count their use of short-term subordinated loans as part of
capital.1 9 The use of subordinated loans, where allowed, is subject
to strict lock-in restrictions that prohibit repayment by securities
firms at maturity if it would bring the firm's capital below a threshold
level. 120 Regulators stressed that access to such loans can boost cap-
ital bases quickly in response to changing market or counter-party
risks and facilitate securities firm compliance with capital require-
ments. In addition to the "lock-in" provisions, a majority of the
Technical Committee' 2 1 indicated that it would be willing to accept,
as part of an international agreement, an upper limit on the use of
subordinated loans of 250% of equity capital and retained earnings.
The upper limit is equivalent to about 70% of a firm's total equity
capital plus subordinated loans.' 2 2 These limits parallel those of the
SEC.12 3
A majority of Technical Committee members also indicated that
there was no need for sub-limits, referred to as inner limits, within
the 250% limit on subordinated capital on the use of loans from un-
regulated group entities and entities outside the group. Three coun-
tries, France, Germany, and Switzerland, disagreed with the majority
because the absence of inner limits would permit securities firms
greater access to intra-group loans than allowed for banks and a
117 GAO, SECURITIES MARKETS 92-41, supra note 79, at 33.
118 lOSCO Memorandum, supra note 1, at 1-8.
119 Two members of the Technical Committee expressed concern about including
subordinated loans as part of capital and would prefer a definition of capital that is closer
to that specified by the Basle Committee. See id.
120 For example, in the United States, payment would not be permitted if it would,
together with any other payments scheduled for the next six months, reduce net capital
below 1200% of the minimum required level for net capital or fail to meet other rigid
requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-ld(b)(8).
121 See IOSCO Memorandum, supra note 1, at y (two members dissenting).
122 See supra text accompanying note 75.
123 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(d).
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group with unregulated entities could artificially inflate its capital.' 24
This dispute arises because pure securities firms would have a lower
cost of capital than security firms in the form of universal banks,
which are subject to Basle capital requirements that mandate a
subordinated debt limit equivalent to 50% of equity capital for
banks. 12 5 The majority of Technical Committee members pointed
out that the artificial capital argument could arise without inner lim-
its because an unregulated entity in a group could issue short term
paper and convert it into equity capital in the regulated entity. The
majority argued, therefore, that the appropriate solution lay in better
supervision of financial conglomerates.
2. Comprehensive or Building Block Approach
The securities regulators in major markets use the comprehen-
sive approach 12 6 that endeavors, through haircuts, to capture specific
and general market risks in one risk weight. Adverse price move-
ments arising from factors linked to the issuer give rise to "specific"
risks. Adverse price movements that are unrelated to an issuer are
"general" market risks. 127 In contrast, proposals of the Basle Com-
mittee Working Parties recommend an approach that separates spe-
cific and general market risks related to traded securities.' 28 This
approach is called the building block approach, which includes "X"
capital charges for specific risks and "Y" capital charges for general
risks. Nonetheless, most securities regulators seem willing to accept
the building block approach for both equity and debt securities. 12 9
Some members of the Technical Committee agreed that the
building block approach would be acceptable for securities firms,
provided that it was implemented with a transition period.' 30 The
Japanese Security Bureau stated that it would prefer to maintain the
comprehensive approach and retain Japan's capital adequacy rules
that went into effect in 1990. Nonetheless, Japan indicated a willing-
ness to adopt the building block approach if everyone else did. 13'
The SEC stated that it would not give up the comprehensive ap-
proach, as implemented in its net capital rule, although it "would
124 See IOSCO Memorandum, supra note 1, at 5. There was also disagreement about
whether there should be limits on capital from outside of a group. Some felt that a trigger
of the lock-in provisions would alert lenders to a potential problem, while others felt that it
was a sign of strength that lenders would provide funds subject to a lock-in provision.
125 See Base Accord, supra note 2.
126 At least, France, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom. See supra text
accompanying note 87. German universal banks fall under bank regulation based on the
principles of the Basle Accord. See supra text accompanying note 38; see also GAO, SECURI-
TIES MARKET 92-41, supra note 79, at 56.
127 See IOSCO, Equity Position Risk, supra note 30.
128 See IOSCO Memorandum, supra note 1, at 8.
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support the use of the building block approach as a means of expres-
sing a minimum standard."' 132 The SEC supports the comprehen-
sive approach with its use of haircuts and limits on leverage because
it has provided an "accurate and financially responsible safety mar-
gin against the risks to which broker dealers holding equity positions
have been exposed, especially in times of market stress."' 133 Obvi-
ously, a similar capital standard could, in theory, be established by
using a one-step (a comprehensive) approach or a two-step (a build-
ing block) approach. The debate reflects different capital require-
ments among countries and variances between banks and nonbank
security firms. The issue is not merely what level of capital should be
assessed against proprietary trading of securities firms, which, for ex-
ample, differ in the United Kingdom and the United States. It is also
a question of against what activities the capital requirements should
apply. For banks and countries like Germany with a universal bank-
ing system, capital requirements are assessed against all assets. In
contrast, in some countries without universal banking, regulators
only apply a system of haircuts to the securities firms' own securities
positions, although other limitations, such as those on the amount of
subordinated debt, can act as a prudential curb on the firms' abilities
to expand and to engage in risky activities.
3. Debt Position Risk for Securities Firms
Debt position risk arises when a securities firm holds debt secur-
ities of other firms for its proprietary accounts. The main issues
cited in the 1991 IOSCO Memorandum relate to what constitutes a
qualifying security and what offset rules should apply. 134 A qualify-
ing security is generally an easily marketable, high-grade corporate
security. 13 5
132 Id.
133 See Equity Securities, compiled in Papers Relating to Capital Adequacy of Securities Firms,
Division of Market Regulation, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, at 70-71 (1991)
(submitted to the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions for the July 16-17, 1991 meeting in Paris, France, 17 (1991)) [hereinafter
SEC, Equities Paper].
134 See IOSCO Memorandum, supra note 1, at 6-7. Note that there was also an issue of
whether bonds should be placed into the regulatory scheme for capital charges based on
duration or residual maturity. Duration is a weighted average time to payment of interest
and capital. Duration is generally used to measure the sensitivity of bond prices to interest
rate changes. The SEC is against the use of duration for regulatory purposes, but the rest
of the Technical Committee appears willing to consider accepting duration as an alterna-
tive methodology. See id. at 7.
135 See IOSCO, Debt Position Risk, supra note 110. Japan and the United Kingdom class-
ify, and assign risk weights to, bonds as government, qualifying or high quality corporate,
and other. The United States classifies, and assigns risk weights to, bonds as government
or government guaranteed, municipal, Canadian Government, nonconvertible debt issues
rated in one of the top four categories, and others (those bonds that have at least two
market makers). Id. The Carosio group would have allowed offsetting rules to apply to
junk bonds; the U.S. SEC treats junk bonds like equities. See SEC, Equities Paper, supra note
133, at 91; Capital Adequacy Standards for Positions Subject to Interest Rate Risk, compiled in Papers
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The Carosio group, a Basle Committee subgroup, recom-
mended a building block approach. Each bond would be assigned a
risk factor for specific risk (X) and general market risk (Y); the two
risk factors together would then be added to derive a capital charge
for a bond within a given maturity band.' 36 Capital charges for mar-
ket risks could be substantially reduced by taking offsetting posi-
tions; the charges for specific risks would remain unchanged. The
Carosio group proposed the adoption of three zones, with thirteen
sub-zones or bands.' 3 7 The maturities would be up to one year in
Zone One, up to four years in Zone Two, and more than four years
in Zone Three. A long and short position could be almost com-
pletely offset within the same time band.' 38 A long and short posi-
tion between zones could be offset, but to a lesser degree.' 3 9
Offsetting within the same maturity band is called vertical offsetting,
while those in different bands are called horizontal offsetting. Effec-
tively, some degree of offset would be permitted for hedging a long
position in any bond of any maturity with a short position in any
other bond of any maturity. The underlying assumptions are that (1)
interest rates on all debt instruments change in the same direction at
the same time; and (2) changes in the market value of bonds in one
maturity will offset those of another security with a different
maturity. ' 40
In response to the Carosio proposals, the SEC proposed the
Relating to Capital Adequacy of Securities Firms, Division of Market Regulation, U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, at 70-71 (1991) (submitted to the Technical Committee of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions for the July 16-17, 1991 meeting in
Paris, France (1991)) [hereinafter SEC, Debt Paper].
The Technical Committee appeared willing to expand the definition of qualifying is-
sues to include securities issued by banks that meet the Basle Capital Adequacy Standard.
The Technical Committee's proposal is broader than the current definition in some coun-
tries, because not all banks of high quality have their debt securities rated or listed. But, it
is narrower than the definition proposed by the Carosio Working Party, a working party of
the Basle Committee, because not all banks' securities would be considered qualifying. See
IOSCO Memorandum, supra note 1, at 7.
136 See IOSCO Memorandum, supra note 1, at 3, 6-7.
137 See SEC, Debt Paper, supra note 135, at 16.
138 The U.S. net capital rule permits a long position and a short position within the
same time band to be completely offset each other. The Carosio group says that they will
offset each other, subject to a disallowance of 10% on one side. The rationale for the
Carosio approach is that even bonds of the same maturity might not have exactly the same
correlation, or tendency for prices to change in exactly the same way. According to SEC
calculations, the resulting capital requirement on bonds within the same time band would
be virtually the same as that resulting from capital charges based on a complete offset. See
id. at 40-42.
139 The disallowance factor is 30% between adjacent zones and rises to 100% be-
tween zones One and Three. These disallowance factors still permits offsetting between
zones. For example, if there was a $100 general market risk charge on a long position in a
bond in zone One and a $100 charge on a short position in bond in zone Three, the
disallowance of 100% of one side would leave a $100 capital charge. This charge is half of
what the result would be if no offsetting were allowed. See id. at 16-17 n.6.
140 See id. at 5.
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adoption of a building block methodology and the use of zones of
different maturities.14 But, the SEC urged a rolling band approach.
A bond in one maturity band could be offset with a bond that fell
within a limited maturity range above and below the band.' 42 Pro-
gressively lower degrees of offsetting would be permitted as the ma-
turity band of a bond was farther away from the maturity band of the
bond to be offset. No offsetting would be permitted between bonds
with maturities of more than a certain number of bands apart or be-
tween Zones One and Three. 143 A majority of the Technical Com-
mittee members rejected the Carosio proposals on offset rules
because the proposals would lead to substantial reductions in the
amount of capital required by securities regulators144 on portfolios
containing long and short positions in securities. The majority' 45
supported offset rules along the lines of those proposed by the SEC.
4. Equity Position Risk for Security Firms
Equity position risk arises when a securities firm holds equities
of other firms for its proprietary account. A majority of the Techni-
cal Committee was willing to accept an approach that sets both a
minimum percentage of capital on the gross position and on the net
position. This approach is called the "X + Y approach."' 146 Under
this approach, a minimum standard of 4% on the gross position,
needed to cover specific risk inherent to a particular security and 8%
on the net position, needed to cover the general market risk, would
apply to diversified portfolios of highly liquid or qualifying equi-
141 Id. at 1-2, 90. In the United States, the net capital rule divides government securi-
ties into four categories based on maturity (which are further divided into subcategories)
and nonconvertible, highly rated corporate debt into nine bands. Within each subcategory
of government bonds, the SEC allows a complete offset between long and short positions
so that a capital charge would only be assessed against the net position. Partial offsetting
of capital charges (or haircuts) is then permitted within a category, and, in limited cases,
between categories. Offsetting is also permitted on highly rated nonconvertible corporate
debt. Within certain limits, capital charges on corporate debt may also be offset by govern-
ment bonds. Id. at 20-26.
The SEC proposal was aimed at increasing capital charges from levels proposed by
the Carosio group by reducing the offset opportunities between bands of different maturi-
ties. See id. at 90.
142 See id. at 91.
143 Id.
144 Notably those in Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See IOSCO
Memorandum, supra note 1, at 6.
145 Three countries, however, expressed reservations. Germany stated that it could
accept the SEC proposal as a compromise. Australia, which tends to favor tighter offset
rules than the SEC, stated that it could not yet endorse the SEC proposal because regula-
tors had not yet tested the proposals using data from Australian markets. France would
prefer the Carosio proposals and expressed the view that the SEC proposal was too harsh
with respect to the ban on offsetting between maturity zones one and three, the level of the
vertical disallowance factor in zone one, and the fact that vertical disallowances differ
among zones. See id. at 6.
146 This approach was one discussed by the Barnes Working Party. See id. at 8.
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ties. ' 47 That is, the capital requirement would be 4% of the value of
the long position, 4% of the value of the short position, plus 8% of
the net position. Thus, for a portfolio with a long position of $100
and a short position of $100, the capital requirement would be $8 as
calculated by 4% of $100 (the long position) plus 4% of $100 (the
short position) plus 8% of $0 ($100-$100, or the long position less
the short position). 148 A portfolio with a long position of $100 and
no short position would have a capital requirement of $12 (4% of
$100 long position plus 4% of $0 short position plus 8% of $100 net
position). A portfolio that is balanced with both short and long posi-
tions has a lower capital requirement than a portfolio with only a
long position. The rationale is that a balanced portfolio is less
risky.1 49 Despite the emergence of an apparent consensus, consider-
able disagreement among the securities regulators still exists. For
example, regulators noted that global equity markets are not homo-
geneous and suggested that the X + Y approach fails to take into
account political risk, the varying degrees of volatility and liquidity in
different markets, the variety of market structures, and other unique
local features.150
Regulators did not agree on the extent to which capital charges
should be lowered when portfolio diversification reduces the riski-
ness of portfolios.' 5' France, Japan, and the United Kingdom con-
sider that the "four plus eight" standard is too high and overstates
147 For other equities, the minimum standard would be 8% of the gross position and
8% of the net position. Id.
148 See SEC, Equities Paper, supra note 133, at 21-22, Exhibit A.
149 See id. at 6; IOSCO Annual Conference: Technical Committee Sends Capital Memorandum to
Banking Supervisor, INr'L. SEC. REG. REP. (Oct. 7, 1991).
150 See JOSCO Memorandum, supra note 1, at 8.
151 Portfolio theory is based on the proposition that an investor can get higher returns
if he doesn't put all of his eggs in one basket. The demand for financial assets are a func-
tion of risks and expected return. The risks arise because the future price cannot be pre-
dicted accurately, that is, prices follow a random walk. See KENNETH GARBADE, SECURITIs
MARKETS 134, 241-265 (1982). The random walk theory has also been expressed as the
idea that "Prices have no memory and yesterday has nothing to do with tomorrow." See
SEC, Equities Paper, supra note 133.
The return on an asset may be the same as another asset, in which case, the returns
would be perfectly correlated. If the price of one asset goes up and the price of a second
asset falls by the exactly the same amount, then the returns are have a perfect negative
correlation and the risk of this two asset portfolio would always be zero. Mathematically, it
can be shown that holding a portfolio of assets, rather than one asset, will reduce risks
even when the returns on the assets a zero or an arbitrary correlation. See GARBADE, supra,
at 134.
Portfolio theory serves as a foundation for evaluating whether financial markets are
efficient. If investors do not make use ofall available information in forming their expecta-
tions on the return of assets, then equilibrium prices will not fully reflect all relevant infor-
mation and some investors can earn abnormally high returns by exploiting information
ignored by others, If information about past patterns of securities prices (or historical
information) does not improve an investor's ability to predict future prices, then the mar-
ket is weak-form efficient. If expectations of future prices have been formed on the basis
of all information in the public domain (and not just historical information), then the mar-
ket is semi-strong efficient. If no information exists that could be used to improve an
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the risks in diversified portfolios. The SEC maintains that lower cap-
ital requirements based on portfolio diversification theory are not
appropriate because: (1) not all risks are reduced through diversifica-
tion; (2) it is unclear what constitutes a sufficiently diversified portfo-
lio; and (3) it would be extremely complicated to administer a capital
rule that required regulators to assess whether portfolios were ade-
quately diversified. 15 2
Regulators have conceded to disagreement in other areas as
well. 153 Individual regulators have discretion to define what consti-
tutes qualifying equities and diversified portfolios. 154 Regulators
agree that arbitrage activities will require separate treatment and
that this issue should be resolved in another IOSCO sub-commit-
tee.' 55 Finally, Japan said that it would adopt the standard if all par-
ties agree to it, while the United States has said that it will maintain
its net capital rule, but ensure that capital requirements meet or ex-
ceed the agreed upon standard. 156
C. Is IOSCO Headed in the Right Direction?
IOSCO seeks to harmonize standards of capital adequacy in the
major securities markets by setting common minimum levels. If suc-
cessful, the commonality approach could appropriately set a floor
below which neither competition nor regulatory arbitrage could
force international regulation and establish a basis for prudential
regulation to mitigate systemic risks.'
57
In its September, 1991 Memorandum, IOSCO ostensibly made
investor's return, then the market is strong form efficient. It appears that financial markets
may be semi-strong form efficient, but not strong form efficient. See id. at 265.
152 The SEC argues that not all portfolio risk can be reduced through diversification.
The SEC finds that there is "valuation risk" stemming from market inefficiency in deter-
mining a stock's inherent value and from unexpected future developments that affect a
stock's inherent value. The SEC might be saying that the market is not strong-form effi-
cient because it does not incorporate insider information. The SEC also maintains that
there is "volatility risk;" or the risk of substantial market movement during periods of
market stress. See SEC, Equities Paper, supra note 133, at 7. Note, the SEC also believes that
"an international capital standard should provide adequate coverage for the worst days
and the most aggressive trading firms, not just representative days or portfolios." Id. at 31
(discussing why the 2/8 version of the building block approach was inadequate).




157 The contra argument is that the costs of harmonization could inhibit the develop-
ment of new or hybrid financial products and could be costly generally if capital require-
ments are too high. U.S. Commodities Future Trading Commission's Commissioner
Albrecht urged the abandonment of harmonization in favor of continued competition. He
suggested that "the CFTC favors a policy of combining national treatment with mutual
recognition." See OTA, TRADING AROUND THE CLOCK, supra note 39, at 79. Such a principle
would, for example, permit a foreign firm to operate in the United States if it complied
with the regulations of its country of origin and the rules of the country of origin and the
United States were comparable. Id.
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progress among securities regulators toward establishing a definition
of capital and a minimum level of capital for position risks. The ap-
parent consensus, however, may be a mirage; the EC members of
IOSCO released a revised version of proposed EC rules on capital
adequacy that differs from the IOSCO Memorandum.158  The
IOSCO Memorandum also did not address how to harmonize regu-
lations between securities firms, which would face IOSCO rules, and
universal banks, which would face IOSCO rules on securities activi-
ties and Basle capital adequacy rules on all assets. Significant pro-
gress appears to have occurred at IOSCO's January, 1992 meeting; a
consensus may be emerging that would effectively strip out the se-
curities activities from banks and subject them only to IOSCO
rules. 159
Other issues include whether the use of two parallel systems, a
comprehensive and a building block approach, will make already
complex securities regulation even more complicated. By establish-
ing minimum standards expressed in either approach, however, the
parallel use of both approaches might reduce the potential for regu-
latory arbitrage between major international banks that use the Basle
Committee approach and securities firms. Additionally, the risks of
securities firms and other market intermediaries may be vastly differ-
ent. Dealers, who take positions, for example, need more capital
than brokers, who match orders. To some extent, these differences
are taken into account when regulators set different minimum capital
levels.
IOSCO seems to be working to develop a consensus in which
minimum levels of capital are specified. One question that should be
asked is how to determine how much capital is needed to cover risks.
The assumption that past volatility or past market stress is an indica-
tor of future market stress should be closely examined. Regulators
also need to assess and to recognize the degree to which trading
strategies and derivatives reduce securities firms' risks.
158 See Amended CAD, supra note 6. For example, the January version of the EC pro-
posal would have permitted a lower amount of non-equity finance to count toward security
firm capital. The June version would permit the same amount of subordinated debt as the
IOSCO Memorandum. See infra text accompanying note 194.
159 See Joint Statement, supra note 4, at 2. The statement says that:
(1) with respect to holdings of traded debt securities, the building block ap-
proach would be used by all regulators and regulators from only one country
had reservations about minimum levels of capital and definitions of off-set-
ting rules;
(2) with respect to equity securities, bank supervisors and some securities
supervisors would use the building block approach, while other securities su-
pervisors would continue to use the comprehensive approach and would
demonstrate that their requirements would equal or exceed capital require-
ments under the building block approach; and
(3) regulators would consider some provision in the definition of capital for
banks' trading portfolios so that permitting the use of subordinated debt for
securities portfolios would not give securities firms an advantage over banks.
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IV. IOSCO Consensus v. Basle Accord
One handicap to developing consistent securities regulation is
that banks engage in activities that resemble those undertaken by se-
curities firms. 160 Perhaps the best method of overcoming this handi-
cap would be to segregate the bank's securities portfolio and apply
securities regulation to these activities, although this may involve
thorny, political problems of how to get domestic bank and securities
regulators to coordinate regulation. t6 ' Another option is to harmo-
nize regulations so that the entity, whatever its form, maintains
enough capital and follows enough prudent practices to maintain the
safety and soundness of the financial system. This approach fails to
address level playing field issues between banks and securities firms,
domestically and internationally.
Regulators have considered.both solutions. For example, U.S.
regulators mandate that securities transactions of banks take place in
a subsidiary.' 62 At the international level, banks and securities regu-
lators are considering ways to harmonize regulations. This section
first examines bank regulation and then compares it with the consen-
sus emerging among securities regulators.
A. Bank Regulatory Harmonization: The Basle Accord
In July of 1988, regulators from the Group of Ten countries 163
endorsed the Basle Committee' 64 proposal establishing a common
framework for international bank supervision. The framework only
focused on credit risks. It did not focus on market risks related to
changes in interest or foreign exchange rates or on the disparate
treatment of banks because of different tax and accounting regimes;
rather the Accord envisaged future work toward establishing a com-
mon framework in these areas. 165 The main elements of this Accord
were to:
a define the elements of capital, which was divided into (1) core, or
"tier 1," capital in the form of equity capital and disclosed reserves
and (2) ,supplemental, or "tier 2," capital in the form of undisclosed
reserves, general provisions, subordinated loans, and hybrid
debt/capital instruments;
* assign credit risk weights to various types of exposure;
160 See supra text accompanying notes 36-47.
161 This solution could involve two different types of regulators examining one entity,
unless the entity is a universal bank so that a single regulator could propound rules or the
bank is one entity in a group and the securities firm is another entity so that two regulators
would examine two separate entities.
162 See GAO, SECURrrIEs SUBSIDIARIES, supra note 47, at 2-3, 11.
163 The Group of 10 is comprised of: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. See Basle Ac-
cord, supra note 2.
164 Id.
165 See id. Nonetheless, some market risk is effectively taken into account by the Basle
Accord's treatment of off-balance sheet items.
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0 set a minimum standard for the ratio of capital to risk weighted
assets; and
* provide for a transition period, with full implementation to be
completed by January 1, 1993.166
By January 1, 1993, international banks are required to have
capital equivalent to 8% of their risk-weighted assets, of which Tier
Two capital could not exceed four percent. 167 In addition,
subordinated debt cannot count for more than the equivalent of
50% of Tier One capital, only part of unrealized capital gains can be
counted as part of Tier Two capital 168 and only a limited amount of
general provisions/loan loss reserves can count as capital.' 69 The
Basle Committee considered that subordinated debt had the draw-
back of having a "fixed maturity and inability to absorb losses except
in liquidation." 
70
Regulators intended that the scheme of assessing capital against
risk-weighted assets be relatively simple to apply, despite differences
in the structure of banks in different countries. Regulators also in-
tended to incorporate the risk of both on-balance-sheet (e.g. loans)
and off-balance-sheet (e.g. commitments and guarantees) activities
and not to deter banks from holding liquid assets.' 7 1 The scheme
classifies assets by the type of counterparty into four risk weights:
zero, twenty, fifty and one hundred percent.' 72 Thus, for example,
cash and claims on central governments receive a 0% weight, while
riskier loans to the private sector receive a 100% weight.' 73 Off-bal-
ance-sheet items are first converted into credit risk equivalents by
multiplying the principal amounts by a credit conversion factor; the
risk-weights are then applied to these equivalents.' 74
Under the Basle Accord, bank or publicly guaranteed loans or
assets collateralized by cash or securities issued by certain public en-
tities are assigned the risk-weight of the bank or the public entity,
rather than the borrower. The Basle Accord also provides for a
166 Id. To assign credit risk weights, a system was developed consisting of five risk
weights, ranging from zero to one hundred percent, that were assigned to different types
of assets (cross-border loans, governmental entities, collateral and guarantees, residential
property mortgages, off-balance sheet engagements). See id.
167 The limit is expressed as "The total of Tier 2 (supplementary) elements will be
limited to a maximum of 100 percent of Tier I elements." See id.
168 Only 45% of the difference between the historic book cost and the market value
can be counted as tier 2 capital. This limit is expressed as "In the case of 'latent' revalua-
tion reserves a discount of fifty-five percent will be applied to the difference between his-
toric cost book value and market value to reflect the potential volatility of this form of
unrealized capital and the notional tax charge on it." See id.
169 This limit is expressed as "general provisions/general loan loss reserves will be
limited to a maximum of one and one quarter percentage points, or exceptionally and
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crude assessment of country risk in applying its risk-weights to cross-
border bank assets. Loans to central governments and other sover-
eign entities of OECD countries receive a lower risk-weighting than
those of non-OECD countries. T75 The Basle Accord explained that
foreign exchange and interest rate contingencies needed special
treatment because "banks are not exposed to credit risk for the full
face value of their contracts, but only to the potential cost of replac-
ing the cash flow ... if the counterparty defaults."' 176 The Accord
contains two methods of dealing with the credit risk of these contin-
gencies: (1) mark the value of the contingencies to market and then
add an amount to reflect the potential future exposure, or (2) apply a
factor to the amount of the original exposure. The second approach
reflected the view, held by a minority of regulators, that the marked-
to-market approach was inconsistent with the rest of the capital ade-
quacy framework of the Basle Accord.
The Basle Accord was not automatically imposed on each coun-
try. Countries had to adopt the framework into their own law. 177 By
September 1990, countries with the main financial centers adopted
the framework set forth in the Basle Accord.' 7 8 As part of the efforts
to create a single European market, the EC adopted three key bank-
ing Directives that are generally consistent with the Basle
framework. ' 79
B.. Basle Accord and IOSCO Consensus: A Comparison
The first key difference between the traditional roles of bank and
securities regulators lies in the type of assets and accounting of the
entities that they regulate. Loans and other bank assets are generally
not easily marketed assets and are not carried on bank books at mar-
ket value.' 80 In contrast, securities held, traded, or sold by securities
firms generally are marketed easily and have an easily ascertainable
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Some countries have supplemented risk-based capital adequacy requirements with
other national measures designed to constrain banks' ability to lever their capital bases. In
the United States, for example, bank holding companies must maintain a minimum ratio of
Tier One capital to consolidated assets. The ratio has been set at 3% for top-rated banks
in good condition and at higher levels for institutions with lower ratings and those exper-
iencing significant growth. See IMF, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 37; 12 C.F.R.
§ § 208, 225 (1990); John L. Douglas, FDIC Forced to Focus on Capital Levels, NAT'L L.J., July
13, 1992, at 20-21 (discussing the impact of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Improve-
ment Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (Dec. 19, 1991)).
178 See IMF, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 36.
179 Notably, the Own Funds, Solvency, and Second Banking Coordination Directives.
These Directives are fairly consistent with the Basle Accord, except that unrealized capital
gains cannot count as Tier Two capital. See id. at 36.
180 The Basle Committee struggled with how to deal with collateral and new financial
instruments. The Accord treats bank holding of loans collateralized by assets as private
sector claims unless guaranteed by the central government; there is, however, a lower
weight assigned to residential mortgage loans. Asset sales with recourse are off-balance
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value. Thus, bank regulators are more concerned with credit risks
relating to the borrower while securities regulators traditionally are
more concerned with ways to take into account both market and
credit/counterparty risks.
Reflecting these differences, securities firms value all assets to
market price, thus recognizing unrealized gains and losses, but banks
do not in some countries. Securities firms have a 100% haircut on
illiquid or not easily marketable assets and do not count them in cal-
culating capital,' 8 ' while banks still count them in risk-weighted
assets.
Both the IOSCO proposal and the Basle Accord have an 8%
capital requirement to protect against risks, but the base to which the
capital requirement is applied and the nature of the risks included
are different. For securities firms that segregate client funds, the 8%
requirement is assessed against the net equity position held by the
firm and is designed to protect the firm against general market risks.
For banks, the 8% requirement is assessed against risk-weighted as-
sets held on or off their balance sheets and is mainly designed to
protect against defaults by their borrowers.
In short, the two regulatory schemes at present are quite differ-
ent. To assess the impact of capital requirements on the two types of
financial institutions, similar capital requirements would have to be
applied against a similar base. Thus, for example, banks might apply
the security firm requirements to their trading/securities activities.
To the extent that securities firms engage in banking activities, as a
universal bank or through a subsidiary, they might apply banking re-
quirements. In fact, a press release following theJanuary 1992 meet-
ing of the Technical Committee of IOSCO and the Basle Committee
suggested that regulators may be headed in this direction.' 8 2
With respect to what counts towards capital, securities firms are
viewed as having more access to subordinated loans with less restric-
tions and for shorter terms than banks do. At least two securities
regulators permit the use of guarantees, whereas bank supervisors
do not.' 83 Banks, however, have easier access to cheap deposits and
central bank funds that are not available to securities firms.
sheet items assigned a credit conversion factor of 100%; that is, the bank would apply the
same risk weight as the original asset. See Basle Accord, supra note 2.
181 See IOSCO, Equity Position Risk, supra note 30, at 5.
182 See supra text accompanying note 4. But note, however, that the Basle Committee
is apparently in favor of distinguishing between securities held by banks for long-term
purposes, against which capital requirements might not apply, and those held for trading
purposes, against which capital requirements would apply. On this point, IOSCO sharply
disagrees with Basle because banks could shift securities from their trading books to their
investment books, which, in fact, turnover quite rapidly. See Disagreement Plagues Committee
Discussions on Harmonized International Capital Standards, INT'L. SEC. REG. REP.,July 28, 1992,
at 1.
183 France and the United Kingdom. See IOSCO, Remarks, supra note 29, at 6-7.
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Whether banks or securities firms have a higher effective capital
charge has not been clearly determined.' 8 4 Securities firms in the
United Kingdom, which are allowed to use an amount of
subordinated loans equivalent to 400% of their equity, maintain that
they would face a sharply higher capital charge if forced to comply
with proposed IOSCO limits on subordinated debt, tighter proposed
EC capital adequacy directive limits, or even stricter Basle limits.' 8 5
Moreover, France and the United Kingdom are arguing that IOSCO
is seeking to set specific risk charges, at least for equities, at levels
that would require substantial increases in security firm capital.' 8 6
Securities regulators appear to recognize that in an ideal world
different capital requirements for banks/securities firms would not
influence the form chosen by an entity to carry out its activities. In
the 1991 IOSCO Memorandum, the Technical Committee observed
that even if bank and securities regulators set a common minimum
standard for market risks and definition of capital,
[S]ubstantial differences between the respective overall capital ade-
quacy tests would remain and, as a result, some Technical Commit-
tee members point out that harmonizing the market risks alone
would not create a "level playing field." They point out that securi-
ties firms could be at a competitive disadvantage if the market risk
requirements for banks and securities firms were the same, but only
securities firms were subjected to a base requirement and net liquid
assets test. On the other hand, if all national banking requirements
were taken into account, together with the Basle Convergence Ac-
cord, the balance in some countries could well be in favor of the
securities firms because many banks are subject, inter alia, to high
initial minimum capital requirements.18 7
The potential for regulatory arbitrage between banks and secur-
ities firms appears to have increased as a result of financial deregula-
tion in the major industrial countries in the 1980s. The Basle Accord
attempts to develop a common capital standard for banks, while the
emerging IOSCO consensus appears directed toward establishing a
common capital standard for securities firms. If the two groups co-
ordinate, the incentives for regulatory arbitrage should diminish and
184 But one observer stated: "If adopted, the proposal would force nonbank securities
companies to increase their capital, forcing up their costs. The proposal has sparked con-
cern particularly in the UK, where nonbank companies dominate the securities industry."
Richard Waters, Brokers Should Meet Capital Adequacy, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1991, at 30.
185 See id.
186 See id
187 IOSCO Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2. SEC Chairman Richard Breeden noted that:
"If a capital rule is not market neutral, it will essentially function as an indirect system of
credit allocation by the government. By creating an artificial incentive to invest in certain
types of securities rather than to make loans, the current Basle standards seem to fail the
test of market neutrality." Remarks of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman of the U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to the Institute of International Bankers, New York, New
York, at 11 (May 27, 1992)(also cited in SEC Chairman Urges Capital Rules That Cover All
Types of Securities, INT'L. SEC. REG. REP., June 16, 1992, at 6).
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a level playing field might emerge.' 88
V. The European Community's Capital Adequacy Directive
The EC Finance Ministers have examined the amended proposal
for the CAD' 8 9 several times during the past two years. The CAD
effectively attempts to treat the trading books, defined to include
proprietary positions taken in any security, 190 of banks and securities
firms in a manner similar to the IOSCO proposal and to treat non-
trading book activities of the two types of institutions in the same
manner. On the surface, the CAD seems to meet the objective of
treating financial conglomerates in a consistent, rational way and
avoids distortions between banks and securities firms.
One of the problems with the CAD is that, to the extent that
non-trading book activities of securities firms do not constitute bank-
ing, it may overstate the need for security firm capital. Thus, the
CAD might require bank-like capital charges on securities firms when
they act merely as agents for clients or when they are engaging in
hedging activities. In contrast, when banks make loans, they do not
act as agents for customers and they take the risk that the borrower
will not repay them. Thus, one problematic issue was whether ar-
rangements involving the borrowing of stock, such as repos and re-
purchase agreements, should be treated like securities transactions
involving a trading position and be subject to the CAD or if they
should be treated like secured bank loans and thus be subject to
higher bank requirements. The EC decided that these agreements
fall under the CAD.' 9 '
The Amended CAD also calls into question the degree to which
the IOSCO proposals represent a consensus among securities regu-
lators: the CAD differs in several significant respects from the
IOSCO guidelines, even though EC members are also IOSCO mem-
bers. In June, the EC Finance Ministers agreed that the CAD should
be reviewed within three years to take into account changes in inter-
188 This will not be an easy task. The effects can be seen, for example, on Chemical
Bank. Chemical found that its capital/risk-weighted asset ratio, as calculated for bank cap-
ital standards, was higher when it included its securities subsidiary than when it excluded
this subsidiary. See CHEMICAL BANKING CORP. 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 33 (1991). To the ex-
tent that it counts capital from its securities subsidiary, Chemical may be more competitive
than other banks because they face a lower cost of engaging in banking activities than
other banks.
189 Directives are a form of EC lawmaking. The Capital Adequacy Directive is not final;
it still must be presented to the European Parliament and approved by the twelve member
states of the European Community. See Credit Institutions, supra note 6. The June, 29th
accord will be officially published in fall 1992, after a final text is approved. The following
discussion is based on the January version of the Amended CAD proposal, an EC press
release, and various news reports.
190 See Amended CAD, supra note 6, at 14.
191 See Amended CAD, supra note 6, at 15; Simon Landon et al., Muted Cheers for the
Single Market: Attempts to Unify European Securities, FIN. TIMES, June 11, 1992, at 23.
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national markets. 192
Under the present approach, overall capital requirements would
include requirements on initial entry and other risks, trading book,
nontrading book, and large exposures.' 9 3 Under the revised CAD
agreed in June 1992, non-bank firms could rely on subordinated
debt for total capital for an amount equivalent to 250% of equity
capital if illiquid assets are not deducted or up to 250% of equity
capital if non-liquid assets are deducted. Banks' subordinated debt
may amount to 250% of equity capital. 194 In contrast, the IOSCO
Memorandum would allow securities firms to rely on an amount of
subordinated debt equivalent to 250%b of equity and the Basle stan-
dards for banks would count an amount equivalent to 50%o of equity.
Initial capital for securities firms would depend on their level of
activity. The CAD would not apply to securities firms engaged solely
in investment advice and/or processing of investors' orders without
holding money or securities on their behalf. Initial capital would be
set at ECU 50,000 for firms that act as intermediaries but do not hold
clients' money or securities; ECU 125,000 for firms managing inves-
tor portfolios or taking orders from investors; and ECU 730,000 for
large firms that take market positions or orders from clients.' 95 Se-
curities firms would also be required to hold an additional amount of
capital equivalent to one quarter of their previous year's fixed over-
head.' 96 Together, the initial and other risk requirements are
equivalent to base and minimum capital requirements.
Capital requirements against position risk would, as under the
IOSCO Memorandum, be assessed using the building block ap-
proach that separates specific issuer risk and general market risk. Ac-
cording to the January version of the CAD, capital charges for
specific risks on debt positions would be: (1) 0% for central govern-
ment securities; (2) on qualifying items, .25% if due within the next
six months, 1.0% if due within six to twenty-four months, and 1.6%
if due in more than twenty-four months; and (3) 8.0% on all other
items.' 97 Capital charges for general market risks would be assessed
in a manner more consistent with the Carosio proposals, rather than
the stricter SEC proposals, toward which the IOSCO Memorandum
asserted that securities regulators were leaning. 198 The Amended
192 See Economic and Financial Questions, 1595th COUNCIL MEETING (Press. Rel. 7460/92,
Press 132), June 29, 1992, at 6 [hereinafter Questions].
193 Amended CAD, supra note 6.
194 See EC Finance Ministers Reach Agreement on Investment Services, Capital, INT'L. SEC. REG.
REP., July 14, 1992, at 1.
195 See Questions, supra note 192, at 5-6.
196 Amended CAD, supra note 6, Annex IV at 49.
197 Id. Annex I at 34.
198 Compare Amended CAD, supra note 6, Annex 1 at 35-40 with SEC, Debt Paper, supra
note 135 (discussing Carosio proposal).
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CAD also provides for calculating general market risks using a dura-
tion methodology.
On equity position risk, the January version of the amended
CAD follows the IOSCO by requiring a specific risk charge of 4%
against the sum of net long and net short positions and a general
market risk charge of 8% against the overall net position. 199 In sev-
eral areas, however, the Amended CAD appears to provide for an
easing of capital requirements relative to the IOSCO proposals. For
example, the Amended CAD provides that the specific risk charge
could be reduced to 2% if: (1) the equities are not those of issuers
that would attract an 8% capital charge on debt securities; (2) the
equities are highly liquid; and (3) no individual position within the
portfolio amounts to more than 5% of the value of the overall gross
position of the portfolio. 200
The Amended CAD also spells out in greater detail the treat-
ment of specific instruments and hedging strategies. It also permits
the use of financial models to assess the underlying risks of options
and swaps, and to serve as a factor in determining capital require-
ments.201 The IOSCO Memorandum suggested that more work
needs to be done in these areas. The Amended CAD also clarifies
the treatment of underwriting. For example, no capital require-
ments against securities being underwritten shall be imposed until it
is clear exactly how many securities the firm will be required to ac-
cept under the underwriting agreement.
Capital requirements would be assessed against foreign ex-
change risks.202 In contrast to the CAD, IOSCO has not yet deter-
mined how to take into account foreign exchange risks and the Basle
Accord aims only at taking into account the credit risks associated
with foreign exchange contingencies. 20 3 If a non-bank has a large
exposure, defined as an amount equivalent to 25% of its capital, to
an individual or a group of connected clients, the firm shall be re-
quired to meet additional capital requirements. Initially, the firm
will have a ten-day window before capital requirements increase be-
cause of the large exposure. The ten-day window reflects in part
concerns by primary dealers and underwriters that they would be un-
able to fully place an issue without facing prohibitive capital costs. In
earlier drafts of the CAD, a five-day window had been proposed. 20 4
199 Compare Amended CAD, supra note 6, at Annex I at 41 with IOSCO Memorandum,
supra note 1, at 8 (similar equity position guidelines).
200 Amended CAD, supra note 6, Annex I at 41.
201 Id. Annex I at 31-33.
202 See id. Annex III at 47-48.
203 Compare Amended CAD, supra note 6, at Annex III, with Base Accord, supra note 2
and IOSCO Memorandum, supra note 1, 1-8 (no mention of foreign exchange risks in the
IOSCO consensus).
204 See Questions, supra note 192. See Credit Institutions, supra note 6. The International
Primary Market Association believes that the CAD could substantially raise capital require-
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VI. Conclusion
The challenge in the efforts to harmonize regulations among se-
curities firms and between banks and securities firms is to simultane-
ously ensure that: (1) the safety and soundness of the global financial
system is preserved; (2) neither entity gains an unfair advantage
through cheaper costs of doing business; and (3) both entities have
an adequate degree of capital and prudential regulation in the event
of difficulties. 20 5 Efforts to harmonize regulations among securities
firms are proceeding under the auspices of IOSCO. Considerable
progress appears to have been made in identifying the main issues
and the possible basis for developing a framework. Securities regu-
lators, however, are still grappling with the issues that bank regula-
tors overcame when they designed the Basle Accord framework for
credit risk for universal banks and banks solely engaged in banking.
Securities regulators are seeking to harmonize regulations among a
greater variety of institutions and intermediaries, regulatory struc-
tures and activities and entities that may have previously gone
unregulated.
Securities regulators appear to be willing to live with a frame-
work that attempts, like the Basle Accord, to separate the types of
risks against which capital should be assessed. Further, regulators
appear to agree on some of the elements for a common framework
based on building block approach, although the United States, if it
followed the IOSCO consensus, would also maintain its comprehen-
sive approach. Substantial work remains to be done to develop a
common definition for (1) capital; (2) haircuts on equities, debt in-
struments, and derivatives; and (3) treatment of trading strategies
and offsetting rules.
One danger that must be minimized is that, in apparently equal-
izing the capital adequacy rules among securities firms and other se-
curities market participants, regulators do not place too high a
burden on some intermediaries that do not engage in the variety of
activities of major multinational securities firms. Assessing the same
capital requirements placed on dealers against brokers would prove
ments relating to underwriting activities. In comparing the CAD with U.K. rules, the Asso-
ciation notes that U.K. rules allow a twenty-eight-day window for underwriting activities.
See Implications of CAD and LED in the International Primary Market, FIN. REG. REP. (May 1992).
205 As one observer put it,
The issue is not really one of trying to establish a level playing field, but of
trying to arrange for two games to be played under a single referee on the
same pitch. In rugby football, players can pick up the ball in their hands and
run with it. Whilst that may appear to give them a significant advantage over
their soccer playing brethren, they labour under the very severe handicap
that the ball cannot be passed forward. However, it would be useless to try
to create competitive equality between a rugby and soccer team, since (apart
from the shape of the ball) the objectives of each game and the scoring sys-
tem are quite different.
Developments on the Capital Adequacy Directive, FIN. REG. REP., Nov. 18, 1991.
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too costly for brokers. This danger is, perhaps, minimal because
large multinational securities firms generally act both as brokers and
dealers and the common framework would apply only to such firms.
Similarly, efforts to develop comparable capital adequacy rules
for banks and securities firms may run the risk that similar rules are
applied to entities with very different activities and risks. These con-
cerns suggest that banking and securities activities might best be
governed by different regulators, with some arrangement, as in the
United Kingdom, for one regulator to take primary responsibility for
supervising a given entity. To the extent, however, that financial
conglomerates engaging in a broad array of financial activities are
really the key financial institutions of the future, the best arrange-
ment may well be for a single regulator to supervise the entire entity.
Appointment of a single regulator would avoid costly overlapping
regulation and ensure that the entire entity focused on the risks fac-
ing it.
The EC's CAD, which attempted to develop a level playing field
for its financial institutions, has developed a framework to apply
functional capital adequacy rules so that, for example, banks' securi-
ties portfolios are treated in the same way as security firms' proprie-
tary positions. In other areas, however, the CAD may impose similar
regulations on financial institutions engaging in very different activi-
ties, thereby creating distortions in their financial systems. More-
over, the CAD diverges, in some respects, from the direction in
which IOSCO appears to be headed and may make the harmoniza-
tion of international regulations more difficult.
Current efforts at harmonizing regulations do not focus either
upon splitting responsibility between regulators or upon forming a
single regulator for the emerging financial conglomerates. Rather,
they focus on harmonizing rules first among securities regulators
and then between securities regulators and bank supervisors. The
current efforts to harmonize rules runs the risk of creating greater
instability by applying similar rules to dissimilar activities. However,
current efforts may be more politically acceptable than mandating
regulatory approaches and may, in the end, wind up at the same
point: achieving sensible rules for global financial conglomerates.
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